Abstract: Each decision-making process is an important cognitive and emotional process
INTRODUCTION
Managers how fi nance their fi rm operations? How should they do? What are the factors that infl uence managers' decisions? How these decisions aff ect to economic wealth? Th ese are important questions and must be answered carefully for the fi rm sustainability. In connection with this, especially the capital structure decisions are important factors in fi nancing fi rm's operations.
Capital structure one of the most controversial issues in corporate fi nance. According to fi nance literature there are various approaches that constitute of the capital structure theories. Nevertheless none of them are constant accuracy. Th e researches as for the validity of each approach, give us confl icting results. Furthermore all of these approaches rely upon a common important implicit assumption that fi nancial market participants like investors and managers make decisions rationally (Vasiliou, 2009:19) . When we look at the studies in Turkey we see that they are based on traditional fi nance theories, too.
However, the psychology science literature is wide and continues to expand day by day. Th is literature which is about human psychology and behavior draws our attention to that most people, including investors and managers, are subject to important limits in their cognitive processes and tend to develop behavioral biases that can signifi cantly infl uence their decisions. Indeed, individual reasons are cognitive shortcuts that infl uence the position, irrational decisions making and non-optimal sides of traditional fi nancial theories. Th ese biases have been identifi ed and classifi ed and grouped as follows: Th e means of representation, reasoning analog bias of conservatism and confi rmation, but also emotions such as loss aversion, optimism and the overconfi dence (Azouzi and Jarboui, 2012:48) . So leading researchers to focus deeper into the real factors that determine capital structure in practice.
Psychology has found that humans tend to have unwarranted confi dence in their decision making. In essence, this means having an infl ated view of one' own abilities. Th is trait appears universal, aff ecting most aspects of our lives. Researchers have asked people to rate their own abilities, for example in driving, relative to others and found that most people rate themselves in the top third of the population. Few people rate their own abilities as below average although obviously %50 of all drivers are below average. Many studies of company CEOs, doctors, lawyers, students, and doctors' patients-have also found these individuals tend to overrate the accuracy of their views of the future (Byrne and Utkus, 2013) .
Behavioral Finance (BF) is an emerging discipline that represents a collection of alternative approaches to refi ne the classical fi nance defi nition of economic rationality. In particular, BF draws on the psychology and cognitive science literatures to examine why individual decision-making often deviates from rational choices in systematic ways (Chira, Adams and Th ornton, 2008) .
BF studies are the psychology of fi nancial decision-making. Most people know that emotions aff ect fi nancial decisions. BF extends this analysis to the role of biases in decision making, such as the use of simple rules of thumb for making complex investment decisions. In other words, BF takes the insights of psychological research and applies them to fi nancial decision-making (Byrne and Utkus, 2013) .
As Gene Epstein stated in "Th e Myth of Rationality: What Really Drives Economic Decisions" when referencing Kaufman (1994) , "it is the nature of human behavior to try to escape discipline". When traditional fi nance fails to explain our lack of rationality, BF off ers alternative explanations of what motivates economic decision-making. Do human beings think the past when developing their strategy for the future? Do they let themselves be infl uenced by the belief that they have control over a situation when there is no way to assess the amount of control? (Chira et al., 2008) .
On the other hand most of the studies that related with BF have focused on investor behavior but the actors are not only investors but also managers in the financial markets. To be considered managers' behavioral characteristics that have an impact on their decisions, ensure taking more consistent and realistic results. Concordantly recent studies show that managerial behavioral biases are receiving growing attention in corporate fi nance. Recent theories have illuminated how biases like overconfi dence and optimism can aff ect various corporate decisions (Azouzi and Jarboul, 2012) . As defi ned Hersh Shefrin, bias is nothing else but the "predisposition towards erros" (Shefrin, 2007) . In other words, a bias is a prejudice or a propensity to make decisions while already being infl uenced by an underlying belief (Chira, et al., 2008) . Th ere is also a nascent empirical literature that has exposed interesting evidence of the eff ects of managerial behavioral biases (Azouzi and Jarboul, 2012) .
In this study BF literature has investigated in the context of psychological and behavioral biases' eff ects on the fi nancial decisions especially capital structure decisions. Th e study is organized as follows; after this introductory section in which the reader is referred to the research topics, follows the next chapter in which focuses on the capital structure and its behavioral aspects. Th e next section deals with the studies in the literature that examines the eff ects of psychological and behavioral factors' on the fi nancial decisions especially on the process of determining to capital structure. Th e paper ends with the concluding remarks.
THEORETICAL BASE
Since the Modigliani and Miller's fi rst study that is about the theory of capital structure, an extensive literature has occurred on this subject. Th is literature has experienced the transaction from Miller's (1977) postulate of tax neutrality which is refused later by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) with their concept of non-debt tax shields, to the static theory that postulates the optimum debt level as a consequence of a trade-off between the tax advantages of borrowed money and fi nancial distress costs (Miguel and Pindado 2001) .
Until the publication of Modigliani-Miller theory of capital structure, there were traditionally prevailed view that there is a direct interdependence between capital structure and corporate value. Such independence stemmed from the perceived fi nancial risk exposure causing that for companies with higher debt levels there were required higher rates of return on debentures as a compensation for risk. On the other hand, there is the cost of equity fi nancing which is higher than a cost of debt fi nancing. As the total cost of fi nancing is obtained as a sum of cost of equity fi nancing and debt fi nancing (Uckar, 2012:169) .
A large portion of the fi nancial economics and corporate fi nance literature has been concerned with building on the MM propositions with the addition of capital and managerial labor market imperfections, and testing the implications of the theories arising from such additions (Sanvicente, 2011).
Many studies have been done on the theories of capital structure so far. Th eories like trade-off theory, pecking order theory, agency costs theory has seen wide acceptance in practice. In this sense, the existing traditional fi nancial theories of capital structure factors are based on the basic data-oriented like agency costs, asymmetric information and transaction costs. Although companies have the same basic data, diff erent fi nancing preferences of fi rms are explained by behavioral theories. In the traditional fi nance theory, an individual is considered to be rational. In these studies, the eff ect of the decision maker's personality is neglected. However, behaviorists tend to emphasize the bounded rationality due to cognitive limitations (Tomak, 2013 ).
As mentioned above, academic research work on capital structure, both theoretical and empirical, has generated many discussions and studies seeking to explain why fi rms do what they do with regard to choosing debt or equity (Soufani, Tse, Cole and Aboulamer, 2012) .All of theresearches hold in common one important point, namely, the implicit assumption that fi nancial market participants as well as company managers always act rationally. However, an extensive and growing literature on human psychology and behavior shows that most people, including investors and managers, are subject to important limits in their cognitive processes and tend to develop behavioral biases that can signifi cantly infl uence their decisions (Azouzi and Jarboui, 2012) .
Th e psychological fact known as bias and its presence in human decision making provide the additional insight on the subject of individual irrationality and broaden the ideals of irrationality (Bashir, Rasheed, Raftar, Fatima and Maqsood, 2013) Capital structure literature contains most of the theoretical and empirical studies that has identifi ed the determinants of capital structure. And also recent arguments about the fi nancial decisions are on the subject that if the behavioral or psychological factors eff ect on the capital structure decisions. Th ese discussions lead us to the science of BF.
BF is the paradigm where fi nancial markets are studied using models that less narrow then those based on Von Neumann-Morgenstern (1947) expected utility theory and arbitrage assumptions. BF uses models in which some agents are not fully rational, either because of preferences or because of mistaken beliefs (Ritter, 2003) .
According to another view BFis a fi eld of fi nance that proposes psychology-based theories to explain anomalies. Several studies in the fi eld of BF has shown how individual emotions and biases cloud over rational thinking and decision-making. Some emotional and cognitive biases such as loss aversion, optimism, overconfi dence etc. impact the decision making (Suresh, 2013). Ricciardi and Simon (2000) say thatBF attempts to explain the what, why, and how of fi nance and investing from a human perspective. Baker, Ruback and Wurgler (2004) state that behavioral corporate fi nance replaces traditional rationality assumptions with potentially more realistic behavioral assumptions. Shefrin (2001) denotes that there are two key behavioral impediments to the process of value maximization. Th e fi rst impediment, which he calls "behavioral costs", is internal to the fi rms and tends to undermine value creation. Th ese costs are associated with errors of managers because of cognitive imperfections and emotional infl uences (Vasiliou and Daskalakis, 2009:20) .
Managers must be a choice between debt and equity while making fi nancing decisions. Th e psychological biases, in managers regarding fi nancing decisions, do not necessarily result in decisions that are consistent with the expected preferences of investors.
When we look at the BF's issues that related with the capital structure, seen that as mentioned in the next section the studies concentrated to the eff ects of psychological biases on the process of fi nancing decision-making especially determining the capital structure. In the next part of the study these studies and researches will be examined.
A REVIEWOF LITERATURE ON THE BEHAVIORAL ASPECTS OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE
Ever since the seminal work by Modigliani and Miller (1958) many studies attempted to explain how fi rms choose their capital structure and whether an optimal capital structure actually exists, which contains both debt and equity, but as mentioned before most of these studies based on traditional fi nance. Nevertheless recent studies or researches in BF show that the behavioral characteristic of a manager is an important factor that in the process of determining capital structure. Th is is exactly where behavioral corporate fi nance emerges. It replaces the traditional rationality assumptions with potentially more realistic behavioral assumptions concerning the various fi nancial decisions.
Behavioral analysis considers the elements of human perception and evaluation of outside situation and events, and most importantly, the emotions associated, both ex ante and ex post with any fi nancial decision. Th is new fi eld of modern fi nance refers to neuroscience debate and assertion that the motivations, emotions, and feelings are indispensable to any human decision, including the fi nancial ones; emotions are essential to any decision and course of action (Mitroi and Oproiu, 2014) . Uckar (2012) , in his study of literature review, says that BF has completely diff erent starting point. Th ey arise from empirical studies of behavior of investors and participants in fi nancial markets. In doing so, through the establishment of certain psychological patterns, they seek to detect behavior that is inconsistent with the assumptions of investor rationality and market effi ciency (Uckar, 2012:170) .
In his research Uckar gives information about the Shefrin (2001) and Heaton's (2002) studies. In Shefrin's study of BF, he states that overconfi dence may induce a manager to adopt an over indebted and sub-optimal capital structure. In similar research Heaton (2002) analyzed the eff ect of overconfi dence on fi nancing decisions in the absence of asymmetric information or moral hazard problems. According to Uckar if the manager is overconfi dent, he believes that fi rm shares are valued under the market value, which opens the mispricing problem. In such circumstances where the cost of capital is not properly defi ned, errors are possible in decisions about the viability of investment projects. Th at is, due to managerial overconfi dence, the managers make project with negative present value that he mistakenly believes to be positive. Also, because of the belief that stocks are underpriced, the manager will select the issue of debt securities as a source of fi nancing for such investment projects. As a result of managerial overconfi dence it comes to the excessive use of debt, high debt ratio and thus a high probability of fi nancial distress (Uckar, 2012:174) .
Impact of behavioral elements in the formation of capital structure can be observed during merger and acquisition procedures as well. In their model, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argue that mergers and acquisition decisions and decisions about methods of fi nancing deals are driven by misvaluations of the participating companies. Since the stocks are mispriced as a result of irrational investors, rational managers recognize this opportunity to arbitration and respond to the mispricing. Th eir model suggests that acquisitions for stock are made by overvalued companies and target companies tend to be less overvalued. In such condition when valuations are high, acquisitions will involve payment in stocks rather than in money (Uckar, 2012:173) .
In their study Ben-David, Graham and Harvey (2007) measures the overconfi dence of managers in a unique sample of over 6,500 stock market forecasts made by top U.S. fi nancial executives. Th eir measure of overconfi dence is based on miscalibration of beliefs, and operationalized using a method drawn from laboratory experiments of overconfi dence. Th ey link their estimate of executive overconfi dence to fi rm-level archival data and study how miscalibration is refl ected in corporate policies. Each quarter, from March 2001 to March 2007, we surveyed hundreds of U.S. Chief Financial Offi cers (CFOs) and asked them to predict expected one-and ten year market equity returns as well as the tenth and ninetieth percentiles of the distribution of market returns. Th ey use the narrowness of the individual probability distributions for stock market returns as proxy for each respondent's confi dence. By evaluating the same forecasting task across all executives, they assess whether CFOs are miscalibrated and disentangle this bias from any potential bias in the mean estimate, optimism (Ben-David, Graham and Harvey, 2007) .
Th ey examine the time series and cross sectional determinants of overconfi dence and analyze the relation between our overconfi dence measure and a range of corporate policies including investment, mergers and acquisitions, fi nancing, payout, market timing and compensation (Ben-David, et al., 2007) .
And fi nally they said that fi rms with overconfi dent CFOs invest more and engage in more acquisitions, and the market reaction to their acquisitions is negative. Th ey also fi nd a positive relation between managerial overconfi dence and fi nancial structure: fi rms of overconfi dent CFOs have higher debt leverage, rely more on long-term debt, and pay fewer shares following price run-ups. Another fi nding from their research is that executive compensation in fi rms with overconfi dent CFOs is tilted towards performance-based pay (Ben-David, et al., 2007) .. In Hachbarth's (2008) capital structure model, higher debt levels, and hence managerial optimism and overconfi dence, are benefi cial for shareholders. Since manager attempts to act in the interest of shareholders, ie. To maximize the perceived value of the company, he will try to optimize the capital structure in such a way as to achieve greater tax savings in relation to agency and distress costs (according to trade-off theory of capital structure). Usually, an overconfi dent manager perceives debt as more undervalued than equity, so he issues higher level of debt than a rational manager (Uckar, 2012:174) Vasiliou and Daskalakis (2009) investigate that whether capital structure decisions and actual fi rm fi nancing in general deviate from the traditional neoclassical paradigm. Th at is, they investigate whether capital structure determination is based on other than rational decisions. Th ese decisions are called rational under the neoclassical paradigm. Th eir research results show that fi rms avoid using long-term debt, thus their capital structure consists mainly of equity. Th e main reason seems to be the big boom of the stock exchange during 1998-2000. In their research they found that there is strong evidence that Greek fi rms have followed the market timing approach of fi nancing by issuing new stock during 1999-2000 when the prices in the ATHEX were high. So this result questions the BF approach and specifi cally the irrational investors-rational managers approach (Vasiliou and Daskalakis, 2009 ).
Accordingto their opinionmost of the managers believe that a new stock issue announcement will either lead to an increase or to no eff ect in the stock price, cancelling the signaling theory and raising questions as to why managers have these opinions (Vasiliou and Daskalakis, 2009 ).
And they continues to explain their fi ndings like that; one way argue that we are using a nonrepresentative sample period where managers could well be biased by the bubble and subsequent decline of the stock markets around the world, not just in Greece. Th ey explain the word of "biased". Th ey say that "biased situation" fi rst presupposes a "correct-nonbiased situation" and second should be caused by an anomaly. In other words, there can be no bias unless something happens to provoke it. Furthermore, it is the assumptions set in every situation that lead to a bias or to a correct situation. Th e bubble and subsequent decline of the stock markets around the world could bias managers under the neoclassical paradigm. Because a bubble and subsequent decline of a stock market are anomalies under the neoclassical paradigm, they could bias managers in their opinions. Managers could be biased under the neoclassical theory, but the neoclassical theory does not seem to hold (Vasiliou and Daskalakis, 2009 ).
Th ey say that if individual managers are indeed responsible for corporate decisions, then they aff ect corporate behavior and performance and their decisions and behavior are the fi rm's decisions and behavior (Vasiliou and Daskalakis, 2009 ).
According to Uckar (2012) the last area where it is possible to isolate the impact of behavioral elements on the formation of capital structure lies in the primary issues of securities. On market for IPO's it is the common occurrence of high fi rst-day return. Th at imply that the issues are underpriced at the off ering price or that managers and pre-IPO shareholders are irrational since that are satisfi ed with a smaller infl ow of new capital than would be possible. Laughran and Ritter (2002) seek to overcome this phenomenon through a model based on prospect theory in which issuers are likely to net the amount of money "left on the table" by an underpriced off ering together with the "gain" in their wealth that comes from the rise in the price of the shares that they retain in the company (Uckar, 2012:173) .
Uckar has also mentioned that the net amount will often be a positive sum with the increase in value of the retained holdings exceeding the diff erence between the off er price and the market price for the shares sold in the IPO. Th erefore, the original pre-IPO shareholders can off set the loss of the underpricing with the good news that their total wealth is higher than was previously expected. According to him, in this way, the previous hypothesis that the managers and pre-IPO shareholders are irrational was disproved. And also he hasmentioned Ljungvist and Wilhelm's study (2005) as an exampleto support for this conclusion In their research Ljungvist and Wilhelm state that issuers of underpriced off erings often use the same IPO underwriter for following equity issues, suggesting they are not unhappy through a larger infl ow of capital, they would not choose the same underwriter (Uckar, 2012:174) .
Th e second path of Uckar's research about the impact of behavioral elements in the domain of corporate fi nance is one that assumes that corporate managers can be subject to behavioral biases and that some of the corporate fi nance transactions they undertake are the result of those biases. Th is second line of research that assumes "irrational managers" is a somewhat less presented in researches (Baker, Ruback and Wurgler, 2007) , but in any case worth studying (Uckar, 2012:174) . Azouzi and Jarboui's(2012) research examine the determinants of fi rms' capital structure introducing a behavioral perspective. In their researcha theoretical analysis has made and results presented that CEO emotional biases highlights role (optimism, loss aversion, overconfi dence) to explaining capital structure choice. Data analyses revealed CEO emotional biases importance in explaining capital structure choice. Indeed, empirical relationship analysis between optimism and capital structure choice shows behavioral dimension role in the explanation. CEO optimism level is positively correlated with a preference for internally generated resources and debt but negatively associated with capital increase. CEO optimistic is reluctant to ask the market to avoid the being evaluated risk. Th ey prefer to fund projects primarily through internal capital debt and then fi nally external equity (Azouzi and Jarboui, 2012) .
And also they found that CEO loss aversion level is negatively correlated with fi rms' leverage ratios and capital increase. CEO recognizes fi rms' operational risk level and loss aversion seeks to reduce its fi rms' total risk by using low of external funding including debt. CEO of high operational fi rms try to control the total risk by limiting the fi nancial risk introduced by debt and the issuance of new shares. He prefers to fi nance its investment projects through internal funds (Azouzi and Jarboui, 2012) .
Th e other fi nding, in their research, is that overconfi dence negatively aff ects internally generated choice, debt and equity but it is positively correlated with the choice of debt and cash fl ow couple, and with the cash fl ow and debt and equity combination choice. Overconfi dence implies CEO alignment their choice with the shareholders' interests. Th us, CEO overconfi dence overestimates his skills to reduce risk. Th is led him to choose high projects risk which is in the interest of shareholders and increases fi rms value (Gervais et al, 2007) . To fi nance its investment choices, this overconfi dence leader considers his company undervalued by the market limits its emissions securities risky. He prefers fi rst internally generated resource (cash fl ow) and uses capital structure combinations to minimize its fi rm's risk (including internally generated resource and debt combination) (Azouzi and Jarboui, 2012) .
Another research was made by Kremer, Lee, Robinson and Rostapshova (2013) . In their research they show that acceptance of small risky gambles and scores on math tests is associated with inventory accumulation among Kenyan shopkeepers. Th ey argue that loss aversion may be one factor helping explain the broader puzzle of why high rates of return on capital among small fi rms in developing countries are both arbitraged away and do not lead to the high growth rates of consumption that the Euler equation would predict. Many Kenyan shopkeepers fail to make small inventory investments with high expected returns. In their papers they examine the determinants of inventory investments and show that shopkeepers who invest one standard deviation more into a risky asset in a laboratory-style game have 10-16 percent larger inventories. Consistent with the view that math skills may be useful in debasing, those with one-standard deviation higher math scores have 14-18 percent larger inventory levels. And fi nally their results are that, loss aversion can potentially help explain a series of puzzles related to the persistence of unrealized high-return investment opportunities. Since a loss-averse fi rm owner may turn down small, highly positive expected return investments if they carry risk, loss aversion off ers a potential explanation for several puzzles and recent empirical fi ndings. Th eir fi ndings are that small business owners behave as if they are loss averse raise the possibility that social safety nets might increase investment among small business owners more generally. Th eir works also suggest that at least some of the heterogeneity in returns to capital identifi ed by Hsieh and Klenow (2009) may be due to diff erences in management quality across fi rms, as opposed to the impact of tax and regulatory distortion across fi rms (Kremer, et al., 2013) .
Another study that examines the eff ect of bias on the fi nancing decisions belongs to Tomak (2013) .In her study Tomak investigates the eff ect of manager's confidence level on capital structure decisions. For this purpose fi rstly she has revealed the determinants of capital structure from the fi nance literature. According to her, generally accepted as the core factors for the market leverage are industry median leverage, tangibility, profi ts, fi rm size, market-to-book assets ratio and expected infl ation. Th ese fundamental variables and confi dence factor that infl uence leverage are used in this model specifi cation. Th e model used in her study is as follows;
LEVERAGEi,t = a0 +a1CONFi,t-1+ a2MB i,t-1 +a3SIZE i,t-1+ a4TNG i,t-1+A5PRF i,t-1+ a6GDP i,t-1+a7INF i,t-1+εit
In this model CONF means the Management Confi dence, MB is Market to Book, SIZE is Firm size, PRF is Firm Profi tability, GDP is Gross Domestic Product and INF is Infl ation Rate. In this research Tomak make two analysis that one of them descriptive analysis and other oneis regression analysis.Th e descriptive statistics on diff erent variables in the model during the period of 2001 to 2012 for the Turkish manufacturing fi rms. As a result; although most of the previous studies document that overconfi dent managers tend to use high level of debt in capital structure decisions, according to Tomak there is not clear and enough evidence for the idea of overconfi dent managers tend to use more debt level therefore management confi dence and leverage relation is uncertain. In addition to this, fi rm size, tangibility of fi rms and GDP measure indicate insignifi cant impacts on leverage. However Tomak found some evidence in her research for fi rm specifi c determinants like size and profi tability. While fi rms size yields a positive impact on leverage, the fi rm profi tability eff ects in the negative way. As the fi rm size increases, the impact of leverage also increases in the fi rm and fi nally profi tability of the fi rm eff ects debt level in the negative way as the profi tability decreases, fi rms prone to use more debt in the fi rm (Tomak, 2013) . Soufani, Tse, Cole and Aboulamer (2012) examine the relationship between anchoring as a behavioral bias exhibited by managers and their decisions on whether to issue debt or equity. Th ey investigate whether anchoring captured by a number of proxies including market to-book ratios, the proportion of shares sold off that are held by managers, the exercising of stock options held by managers long before their expiration dates, share repurchases, stock returns, bond yields, 52-week share price highs, and share prices at last equity issue and last debt issue, suffi ciently explains the changing levels of debt or capital structure mix adopted by fi rms (Tse et al., 2012) .
Another research belongs to Filbeck, Gorman and Preece (1996) . Th ey hypothesize that fi rms may actually make fi nancial decisions based on the fi nancing decisions of some industry leader. In their research they tested the Patel et. al hypothesis that fi rms have a tendency to keep their capital structures in line with the industry and fi nd virtually no support for herding behavior of fi rms and next they tested the hypothesis that fi rms base capital structure decisions on following some industry leader. Th ey fi nd stronger, but still weak support for this hypothesis as well (Filbeck, et al., 1996) . Mefteh and Oliver (2010) consider the impact of manager confi dence as a determinant of capital structure in a sample of French fi rms. Th ey fi nd that traditional determinants of capital structure are signifi cant for French fi rms, as they are for fi rms in many countries. Also they fi nd that manager confi dence, as proxied by industry sentiment indices (described later), is highly negatively signifi cant in explaining French fi rm fi nancing decisions. Th ey said that this result not support the hypothesis that managers are acting according to their expected psychological bias-a preference for debt when they are confi dent. Th ey also decompose their measure of industry sentiment in to a common consumer confi dence component and a unique manager confi dence component and the as a result they fi nd that the manager component does have the expected positive relation with leverage.According to their research investor confi dence is negatively related to leverage and that the unique component of manager confi dence is positively related to leverage. Th is fi nding supports the manager confi dence bias of their preference for debt. Furthermore they say that the investor confi dence component dominates manager confi dence, resulting in an overall negative eff ect of industry sentiment with leverage (Mefteh and Oliver, 2010).
In his study Fowler (2013) try to investigate and understand if fi nance managers are emotionally impacted by an economic outlook, either in a positive or negative way, and if that emotional impact is a factor in their budget recommendations. For this purposes Fowler make interview with the 77 California municipal fi nance managers using a Likert-scale to gather self-reported data about attitudes and behaviors related to emotions and decision-making. As a result Fowler proposes that, fi nance managers rely on valid forecast instruments, experience and the opinions of trusted people to develop their recommendations. Finance managers are aff ected emotionally by the implications of economic data but are able to eff ectively put their feelings aside to make sound recommendations for adop-tion by elected offi cials. (Fowler, 2013) .
In the study of entitled heterogeneous beliefs, moral hazard and capital structure, Bigus (2003) says that heterogeneous beliefs are possible even when there is symmetric information but individuals evaluate the same information diff erently. His paper shows that the form of fi nancing matters when there are heterogeneous beliefs. When heterogeneous beliefs and moral hazard exist, a debt-equity mix might outperform pure debt or pure equity.When there is no moral hazard problem, an optimal contract should ensure that the party who attaches a higher probability to certain revenue or a certain range of revenues, that is, the party who values it more, should keep the revenue in its entirety. And he continue to say that an optimal contract is typically highly nonlinear and may induce the entrepreneur to behave opportunistically after having signed the contract, by for example, infl uencing the distribution of revenues. For these he analyze how well standard fi nancial contracts, such as pure debt, pure equity and mixed debtequity fi nancing (hybrid fi nancing), may be suited to address the issue of heterogeneous beliefs. And Bigus analyzed the investor associates a higher risk with a project (e.g., a venture) than does the entrepreneur. Assuming risk neutrality, heterogeneous beliefs on risk favor equity fi nancing, because then risk does not matter. And also Bigus says that hybrid fi nancing can often be the optimal form of fi nancing and may strictly outperform pure equity fi nancing (Bigus, 2003) .
Th e study of on the subject that Manager's irrational behavior, made by Shao and Wang (2013) . Th eir research purpose is to explore manager's irrational behavior and reasons for it in corporate capital investment decision-making. Th e authors present the approach to discovering manager's irrational behavior in corporate capital investment decision-making; classify the irrational behavior by the steps in decision-making; propose hypotheses on reasons for each irrational behavior; conduct empirical test through hypothesis testing and questionnaires; summarize the real reasons for each irrational behavior according to the empirical results.In their research they fi nd that when estimating cash fl ow, managers will use heuristics for lack of clear frame of mind so cognitive bias and psychological factors take place in heuristics. And they say that the main reason causing irrational behavior in the determination of discounted rate is the defi ciency in fi nancial literacy. Since most managers are confused with the concept of cost of capital, method of risk management and models of discounted rate, cognitive bias and psychological factors function in this step. Th ey say, managers behave irrational while making decision for the reason that cognitive biases eff ect on their behavior (Shao and Wang, 2013) . Ullah, Jamil, Qamar and Waheed (2012) , in their research, show that managers are risk averse, whereas size and profi tability are positively related to the capital structure. Th eir study explains that do the managers adjust their capital structure in accordance with business risk and how the profi tability, size of the fi rm and sales growth are contributing to the capital structure formation. Th eir study cover fi ve years from 2006 to 2010 and using the data from fi ve sectors of nonfi nancial listed companies on Karachi Stock Exchange. Briefl y their study is contributing in research by analyzing the eff ect of risk on debt equity mix of the fi rm listed on Karachi Stock Exchange. Th eir paper is using the data of the Motor Vehicles, Trailers and Auto parts sector of Karachi Stock Exchange from the period of 2006-2010. Th ey apply panel data technique to the 19 fi rms. Th ey apply two analysis, one of them descriptive analysis and other one isregression analysis. Th ey also make collinearity analysis because of observing the factor of multi-collinearity. Th e variables that used in their analysis are capital structure business risk, profi tability, size and sales growth (Ullah, et al., 2012 ).
When we look at the Malmendier, Tate and Yan's (2010) research they say that the measurable managerial characteristics have signifi cant explanatory power for corporate fi nancing decisions beyond traditional capital-structure determinants. In their paper they study the role of managerial traits in explaining the remaining variation. Th ey measure capital-structure relevant beliefs revealed by CEOs' personal portfolio choices (overconfi dence) and identify formative personal experiences early in life ( Great Depression, military) . In the research they derive specifi c implications for fi nancial decision-making and confi rm the importance of managerial traits in explaining observed variation in corporate capital structure (Malmendier, et al., 2010) .
In their research they show that overconfi dent managers view external fi nancing to be unduly costly and prefer to use cash or riskless debt. And they identifi ed the two biggest shocks that are likely to be formative experiences and that aff ect a signifi cant portion of our sample CEOs early in life: growing up during the Great Depression and serving in the military. Th ese traits may later manifest themselves in more aggressive capital structure choices (Malmendier, et al., 2010) .
Th ey use data on CEO option-holdings to measure overconfi dence. Th e data is taken from large U.S. companies. Th e research covers from 1980 to 1994. In their research CEOs have a strong incentive to diversify their personal portfolios since they receive substantial equity-based compensation and since the value of their human capital depends on fi rm performance (Malmendier, et al., 2010) .
As a result, they provide evidence that managers' belief and early-life experiences signifi cantly aff ect fi nancial policies, above and beyond traditional market, industry and fi rm-level determinants of capital structure (Malmendier, et al., 2010) .
According to the Barros and Silveria (2007) diff erences in opinion style and perception of reality related to managers' personal traits can signifi cantly impact observed corporate decisions. And they say that there is evidence that managerial overconfi dence/optimism can be an important determinant of fi rms' capital structure (Barros and Silveria, 2007) . Th eir study examines the possible infl uence of two closely related cognitive biases that are extensively documented in behavioral research, optimism and overconfi dence, on a fi rm's capital structure decisions. Th eir study off ers one of the fi rst empirical tests of this hypothesis and, at the same time, presents new evidence about the factors that better explain observed leverage levels, using a sample of Brazilian public companies. Th ey use a sample of 153 non-fi nancial Brazilian fi rms listed in the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa) with data from 1998 to 2003. In this research the information that belongs to top managers was collected from the Brazilian Securities Commission Annual Information forms fi lled out by all fi rms authorized to publicly trade their stocks from 1998 onwards. Th e information is consist of manager's name, year of birth, year when he or she took up the job, gender, education (fi nancial, general or technical), status (company founder, heir and/or controlling shareholder) and number of preferred or common stock of the fi rm owned by its manager (Barros and Silveria, 2007 ).
When we look at the Fairchild's (2009) study we show that he analysis the eff ects of managerial overconfi dence on fi nancing decisions and fi rm value when investors face managerial moral hazard. Fairchild focuses on the combined eff ects of managerial overconfi dence and moral hazard on capital structure decisions. He develop a fi nancing model in which managerial overconfi dence and agency problems combine to aff ect the manager's debt decision and fi rm value.
In the study two caseare taken into consideration that one of them the manager may have an incentive to exert an ineffi ciently low level of eff ort in running the business. An overconfi dent manager overestimates his ability, and underestimates fi nancial distress costs. Th e fi rst model predicts a positive relationship between overconfi dence and debt. In the second case, the manager has an incentive to use free cash fl ow to invest in a new pet project that may be value-reducing (the free cash fl ow problem). Fairchild says that in this case overconfi dence may result in a decrease in debt and the eff ect of overconfi dence on fi rm value is ambiguous, since a project that may have been value-reducing under a rational manager may indeed be value-increasing under an overconfi dent manager, as the overconfi dent manager exerts higher eff ort.First model supports the existing empirical research that fi nds a positive relationship between managerial overconfi dence and debt. And second model derives a novel result, not previously found in the theoretical or empirical research; managerial overconfi dence may result in a decrease in debt, as the overconfi dent manager overestimates future investment opportunities, and hence reduces debt, compared to the rational manager, in order to invest in these new projects (Fairchild, 2009 ). Eichholtz and Yönder (2014) measure CEO overconfi dence through their exercise of corporate stock options, and distinguish Real Estate Investment Truths (REITs) led by overconfi dent CEOs from other REITs. Th ey combine the REIT information with a sample of almost 8000 commercial real estate transactions and generated predicted values for all the properties in the sample, and subsequently they compare these predictions with the actual purchase and sales prices. Th ey develop a hedonic valuation model of commercial properties to generate predicted prices for all the real estate transactions done by REITs, and then relate the actual purchase and sales prices to these predictions, distinguishing the transactions of REITs led by overconfi dent CEOs from others. Th ey also calculate the diff erence between the actual transaction price and the expected price calculated from a joint regression of REIT transactions and a control sample by other types of buyers and sellers, including REITs for which they cannot determine overconfi dence. Th en they compare the means of the residual transaction prices for REITs with overconfi dent managers and their non-overconfi dent counterparts and do a second stage regression analysis. Th eir research sample consist of 11758 transactions. Th e research covers the years of between 2001 -2012 (Eichholtz and Yönder, 2014 .
CONCLUSION
Although this paper in its structure does not represent an empirical research in the narrow sense, its scientifi c contribution is refl ected in the review of available literature on the eff ect of psychological biases on the fi nancial decisions, especially on the capital structure decisions.In other words this research examines the determinants of fi rms' capital structure introducing a behavioral perspective.
Th ere are very few studies on psychological biases' for managers' capital structure decisions in fi nance literature. Little attention is givenon this subject in the literature.And also when we look at the past decade we see that the studies about the eff ect of the biases on fi rms' capital structure decisions have been increased. So refer to the lately researches they show that analyzing the process of managers' decision-making have based on these biases. As seen above the theorists have included the behavioral aspects to the subject when they do their capital structure analysis. Th eoretical and empirical analysesshow that there is an eff ect of emotional and cognitive biases (overconfi dence, optimism, loss aversion, anchoring etc.) on the fi nancial decisions. Managers are aff ected by their behavioral biases when they are making decisions. However, biased managers should make realistic forecasts.
As a result of the studies above, the fi ndings are summarized as follows; -Managers usually areaff ected by their behavioral characteristics and behavioral biases in decision-making process. -Irrational managers mean thataff ected by their behavioral characteristics.
-Biased managers use their internal resources fi rstly and then secondly they use debt and fi nally equity. -When we look at the literature that consist of examined the psychological and behavioral biases, we see that the overconfi dent bias is more subjected than the others. -Overconfi dent managers believe that their fi rms are valued under the market value and they also value the risk of debt lover than equity. Th is situation causes their debt level higher than the rational managers. -Overconfi dent managers estimate the cost of the investment projects undervalued and estimate the value of the projects overvalued.
Th is study is a due diligenceand a qualitative study. A summary of previously conducted empirical and qualitative studies in the fi nance literature. Th e purpose, to draw researchers'attention to studies that take into account the human factor and to emphasize the importance of this factor in funding or fi nancing, especially capital structure decisions. We hope that this research will be used as a resource for future studies which will be related withsame subject.
